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WITNESS'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE
INVESTIGATIVE PROCEEDINGS
IN 1957 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
ordered an investigation into allegedly improper practices by certain
members of the New York state bar.' One phase of the investigation
consisted of a fact-finding "preliminary inquisition" at which subpoenaed
witnesses were questioned before a Supreme Court judge, who was
assisted by an attorney representing the Brooklyn Bar Association.' For
the protection of innocent parties, the judge was empowered to hold
secret sessions and to exclude witnesses' counsel from the proceedings.3
Among the subpoenaed witnesses were certain private investigators
who were.suspected of misrepresenting their identity to obtain state-
ments relevant to negligence cases. Though personally beyond the
purpose of the investigation, they had been summoned to state whether
any attorneys had collaborated with them in these activities. Shortly
'The Appellate Division acted pursuant to N.Y. JUD. LA w § 90 (McKinney
1948). The investigation was ordered in response to a petition from the Brooklyn Bar
Association. By January 5, i96o, the investigation bad resulted in the disbarment of
eight attorneys, one year's suspension for three more, and judicial censure for another.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 196o, p. 27, col. 3.
" The inquiry was a quasi-administrative proceeding at which there were no parties
and no charges. The presiding judge could make no adjudication. "[T]he result of
the inquiry and investigation . . . would be merely a report to the Appellate Division
and recommendation as to future action, and would not be a final determination."
Matter of M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 App. Div. 2d 790, 791 , 17o N.Y.S.zd 535,
537-38 (1958), motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 676, 149 N.E.zd 538
(1958). See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928) ;
Matter of S. Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 App. Div. 2d 792, 17o N.Y.S.zd 538 (958).
Ordinarily, under this statute, it is the duty of the district attorney, when designated
by the Appellate Division, to prosecute all proceedings leading to disbarment of attor-
neys. But, in a county wholly included within a city or in a county of over 300,000
inhabitants, the presiding judge may appoint an attorney nominated by the local bar
association to prosecute the proceedings. N.Y. Jul). LAW § 90(7) (McKinney 948).
'N.Y. JuD. LAW § 9o(1o) (McKinney 1948), requires that the findings of the
investigation be "private and confidential." It was within the presiding judge's dis-
cretion, under this mandate, to exclude witnesses' counsel from the inquiry. Matter of
M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, supra note z5 S. Anonymous v. Arkwright, supra note 2.
Cf., People ex rel. Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N.Y. 463, z N.E. 6x5 (1885).
On the desirability of secrecy, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote, "The mere summons to
appear at such a hearing and make report as to one's conduct may become a slur and a
reproach . . . The remedy is to make the inquisition a secret one in its preliminary
stages." People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 479, 162 N.E. 487, 492
(1928).
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after receiving subpoenas, they were warned by a member of the in-
vestigating staff that enough evidence had been found for a "prima
fade case" against them, and that this evidence might be presented to
the district attorney if they invoked the fifth amendment and refused to
cooperate.4 At the inquiry, however, the presiding judge assured them
that they had been called only as witnesses against the attorneys under
investigation, not as persons for whom prosecution was contemplated.
On this ground the judge invoked his power to bar their counsel from
the proceedings, although he promised them that they could leave the
hearing room at any time to consult their counsel. The witnesses there-
upon refused to testify, claiming that their right to counsel as guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment was being abridged. They were
convicted of contempt for their refusal to testify.' The United States
Supreme Court sustained the conviction in a five-to-four decision.'
Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority of the Court, held that
the case was controlled by In re Groban, in which the Court ruled that
the right to counsel does not extend to investigatory proceedings from
which no adjudication of rights results.' He cited analogically the
This information was imparted to appellants in an off-the-record conversation
initiated by them in the foyer outside the hearing room. The unofficial warning
apparently represented an attempt to dissuade appellants from any uncooperative action.
The right against self-incrimination was available to appellants under the New York
Constitution. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
' Before the witnesses were convicted, their counsel was allowed to argue the con-
tempt charge. It has been held unconstitutional summarily to convict witnesses for
contempt at secret proceedings without allowing them benefit of counsel. In re Oliver,
333 U.s. 257 (.9t8).
GAnonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287,(1959). Actually the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal on a jurisdictional point because the constitutionality of the
statute was never questioned in the state court. Then, however, the appeal was accepted
as a petition for writ of certiorari, and the writ was granted.
Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan.
352 U.S. 330 (1957). In this case, an Ohio statute permitted fire marshals to
hold closed investigations of the causes of fires. In the course of one such investigation
certain property owners were called to give information about a fire which had occurred
on their premises. They refused to testify unless their counsel could be present. The
fire marshal thereupon ordered them committed to jail until they were ready to tooperate.
This action was upheld in the United States Supreme Court by a five to four margin.
Justice Reed, joined by Justices Burton and Clark, wrote the majority opinion, Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Black
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and
Brennan joined. The majority opinion by Justice Reed stressed that, "Appellants here
are witnesses .... A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of consti-
tutional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a witness before other inves-
tigatory bodies." Id. at 332-33. The fact that ". . . evidence obtained may possibly
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established constitutionality of barring counsel from grand jury pro-
ceedings-. In his opinion, the warning given the appellants by the staff
assistant was unauthorized and was outweighed by the judge's contrary
assurances that prosecution was not contemplated for them. Moreover,
he pointed out, in New York the appellants were sufficiently protected
by the right against self-incrimination."
Justice Black reaffirmed his vigorous dissent in the Groban case. The
nonadjudicatory nature of the proceeding did not, in his opinion, alle-
viate the hardships imposed upon the appellants by denying them coun-
sel. Furthermore, he said, the preservation of innocent reputations was
hardly advanced by barring the appellants' counsel. He then concluded
that no "judge ... or any other government official ... can consistently
with due process compel persons to testify and perhaps to lay the ground-
work for their later conviction of crime, in secret chambers, where
counsel for the State can be present but where counsel for the suspect
cannot."' °
If the proceeding in question had been technically a criminal trial,
appellants would undoubtedly have been entitled to the assistance of
their retained counsel." The problem, however, is whether the right
lay [appellants] .. . open to criminal charges" did not entitle them to counsel. Id.
at 333- Moreover, Justice Reed thought a "presumption of fair and orderly conduct
by the state officials without coercion, or distortion exists until challenged by facts to
the contrary." Id. at 334.
By the date of the instant case, two members of the Groban majority, Justices Reed
and Burton, had left the Supreme Court. But Justices Whittaker and Stewart, who
succeeded them, proved to be of the same bent as their predecessors on this question.
8 Gilmore v. United States, iz9 F.zd 199 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631
(942) i In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 193). Cf., United States v. Scully, 225
F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955). See also, Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 431 (959).
Justice Black, however, distinguishes the grand jury session from the type of pro-
ceeding here in question. He says of grand jurors: "They bring into the grand jury
room the experience, knowledge and viewpoint of all sections of the community. They
have no axes to grind and are not charged personally with the administration of the
law . . . .It would be very difficult for officers of the state seriously to abuse or deceive
a witness in the presence of the grand jury. Similarly the presence of the jurors offers
a substantial safeguard against the officers' misrepresentation, unintentional or otherwise,
of the witness' statements and conduct before the grand jury." In re Groban, supra
note 7, at 347 (dissenting opinion).
9 N.Y. CONsT. art I, § 6.
"
0 Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 299 (1959).
" Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) ; Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954) i House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945). Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932), contains the oft-quoted statement that an accused "requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
This same right is, of course, guaranteed in the federal courts by the sixth amendment.
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to counsel exists at such quasi-administrative proceedings as the one in
question. A line of authority culminating with In re Groban and the
instant case has recognized a distinction between administrative "hear-
ings" and "investigations."' 2 A proceeding that normally results in a
determination of rights after presentation of evidence by adversary par-
ties is considered a hearing.1 3 An investigation, on the other hand, has
no formal parties, and its only purpose is the discovery of information
upon which to base later action.' 4 Obviously, the distinction can become
a nice one. The parties to a hearing are assured extensive rights, in-
cluding the right to counsel. 5 But the witnesses at an investigation
ostensibly have no rights at stake and can be denied the benefit of coun-
sel.' In reality, every proceeding involves the rights of its participants
to a greater or lesser extent; "adjudicative" and "administrative" are
basically conclusory as to the need for counsel.
12 "Whatever the appropriate label, the kind of order that emerges from a hearing
before a body with power to ordain is one that impinges upon legal rights in a very
different way from the report of a commission which merely investigates and advises."
Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1932). See, e.g.,
Bowles v. Baer, 14z F.zd 787 (7th Cir. 1944); It re Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 84
F.zd 316, 318 (2d Cir.), rev'd as moot sub foa., Bracken v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n,
299 U.S. 504 (1936); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853, 868
(E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.ad 95 ( 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 88 (1959) ;
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Scientific Living, Inc., 15o F. Supp. 495, 501 (M.D. Pa.
1957). See generally, i DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.1o (1958) ; Note, Repre-
sentation by Counsel in 4dministrative Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 393 (958).
"3See, e.g., Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Edue., supra note 12; In re Securities &
Exch. Comm'n, supra note i2.
" See, e.g., Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.zd 787 (7th Cir. 1944) ; In re Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, supra note 12.
"1 Note, Representation by Counsel in 4dministrative Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 393 (1958).
"United States v. Levine, 1z7 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. x955); Bowles v. Baer,
142 F.zd 787 (7 th Cir. 194). Cf., United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 763
U.S. 149 (1923); Low Wah Sney v. Backus, 225 U.S. 46o (1912) (preliminary de-
portation proceedings) ; Niznik v. United States, 173 F.ad 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 925 (1949); United States V. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3 d Cir. 1944) (draft
board proceedings) ; The Golden Sun, 30 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (inquiry held
by American consul preliminary to discharge of American seamen in foreign ports).
"7 Statutes have been enacted that guarantee counsel in certain proceedings, regard-
less of the investigative-administrative distinction. Section 6(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides that any person compelled to appear before a federal adminis-
trative agency may have counsel. Administrative Procedure Act § 6(a), 6o Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. ioo5(a) (1958). For limitations thereon, see DAVIS, op. cit. supra
note 12, § 8.io. A New York statute makes the same provision for many agencies of
the state government. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS § 73(3) (McKinney i954). A bill to
extend that proviso to proceedings like the instant one did not pass the New York State
Legislature, however.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The narrow adjudicative-investigative distinction may also be used
to determine that point in the criminal-law process at which the right to
counsel accrues.18  In most jurisdictions, there is usually no right to
counsel during a police interrogation. 9 Nor is the right usually avail-
able at a coroner's inquest,20 or a grand jury session, even when the
witness's own indictment is under consideration.2 ' There is conflict as
to whether the right is available for a preliminary hearing.2 On the
other hand, counsel is generally allowed for the arraignment.3 Here,
too, one proceeding may have as much effect upon the individual's rights
as another proceeding, despite a different technical denomination.
Thus, it can be seen that such mechanical tests as the investigative-
adjudicative distinction are altogether improper limitations on the con-
stitutional right to counsel. Rather, as intimated by Justice Black, "the
naked, stark issue" is whether the person demanding counsel is threat-
ened with so great a harm that to deny him counsel cannot be fairly
justified. 4
This issue demands that careful attention be accorded the circum-
stances surrounding each case. The gravity of the threatened harm
and the likelihood of its realization must be ascertained. The character
of the proceeding must also be considered. Will the inquiry be con-
ducted by an interested state official, such as a district attorney, or by a
disinterested fact finder? Will it be secret or public,25 and will there
" See, e.g., People v. Coker, o4 Cal. App. 2d 224, 23T P.2d 81 (i95i) ; Roberts
v. State, x45 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.zd 666 (945).
See generally, BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS ,26-29
(x955); FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 122-24 (1958)5 Fellman, The Right
to Counsel under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 281, 292-96. The Supreme Court
cases most nearly on point are Crooker v., California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.s. 504. (1958).
1 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 4.33 (1958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.s. 504 (.958).
" See, e.g., People v. Coker, supra note 195 State v. Griffin, 98 S.C. ios, 82 S.E. 254
(1914)-.
"'Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631
(194.2) In. re Black, 47 F.2d 54.2 (2d Cir. 1931). Cf., United States v. Scully, 225
F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
"Many states deny counsel. See, e.g., Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.Zd
56 (1949); Lyons v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 197, 245, 138 P.2d 142, 167 (1943),
aff'd, 322 U.S. 596 (1944.). However, counsel is allowed in a significant number of
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
State v. Braasch, x19 Utah 450, 460, 229 P.zd 289, 293 (195), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
910 (1952).
"8 See, e.g., Winn v. State, 232 Ind. 70, 111 N.E.2d 653 (95 3).
"'Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, z99 (1959).
2' Although secrecy and denial of counsel are separate issues, questions as to the
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be a reliable record?26 How formal will the proceeding be? A related
question is the witness's need for professional assistance. A great deal
will depend in this regard on his own level of sophistication and legal
training as opposed to that of his interrogator. The complexity of the
subject matter will also be relevant. Still another important question
is whether the party asserting the right must contend with rebutting
evidence or witnesses. If so, the skilled assistance of an attorney may
be vital to the effective representation of his position.
Against these factors must be weighed the reasons for permitting
interrogation without counsel. A witness is less likely to testify freely
under the cautioning influence of his attorney.I Moreover, a lawyer's
efforts on behalf of his client will frequently tend to impede a proceed-
ing.26 This is a particularly pertinent consideration where speed and
spontaneity are important to effectiveness, as in a police interrogation. 2
Furthermore, there may be unique reasons for denying counsel-for
example, the need for secrecy in the instant situation.
Several alternatives can be adopted to mitigate the effects of denying
counsel. Testimony improperly obtained from a witness without coun-
sel can be made inadmissible in any subsequent prosecution of the wit-
ness.30  This may be poor consolation, however, when his testimony has
enabled the authorities to gather enough independent evidence for a
case against him. Moreover, it will usually be extremely difficult to
prove that the officials in charge acted improperly.3' The right against
self-incrimination can be made a more effective refuge if the interro-
gators will refrain from the various circumventing techniques currently
propriety of each will often be inextricably tied to the other. The dissenters' pervading
concern with secrecy in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957), and the instant case,
supra note 24, at z98, illustrates this.
In addition to its hearing on the right-to-counsel question, the investigative-adjudica-
tive distinction may also determine whether the proceeding can be held in secret. Bowles
v. Baer, 142 F.zd 787 (7 th cir. 1944). See also, DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 1a, §§ 8.o9,
8.10.
" Justice Black has pointed up the dangers of an inadequate record: "The officer's
version frequently may reflect an inaccurate understanding of an accused's statements or,
on occasion, may be deliberately distorted or falsified . . . .This is particularly true
when the officer is accompanied by several of his assistants and they all vouch for his
story." In re Groban, supra note 25, at 340-41 (dissenting opinion).
2" FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 123 (1958).
"In re Groban, 352 U.s. 330, 334 (1958). "In various proceedings . . . the
presence of lawyers is deemed not conducive to the economical and thorough ascertain-
ment of the facts." Id. at 336 (concurring opinion).
-' Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (958).
"In re Groban, 35z U.S. 330, 334 (1957)-
"Id. at 343 n.16 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. i96o: 457
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
practiced. Even so, few laymen are competent to master the intri-
cacies that may be encountered in asserting that right. 3 Moreover,
unfavorable connotations now attach to pleading it. A better compro-
mise is to allow some, but less than full, benefit of counsel, as in the
instant case. The presiding officer can thus permit only so much partici-
pation by counsel as to him seems necessary.34 To satisfy the require-
ments of due process, however, the degree of assistance allowed must
still be extensive enough to be considered fair when the conflicting fac-
tors have been balanced.
Analyzed along these lines, the instant case should not have been
governed by In re Groban.35 Rather, the position taken by Justice
Black seems preferable. Regardless of the inquiry's nature and imme-
diate purposes, there existed a strong likelihood that the appellants'
alleged activities would lead to criminal charges against them. Any
information they might have provided about their activities would thus
have carried "highly dangerous potentialities. ' 36  Aside from the extra-
official uses to which the testimony might have been put, the Appellate
Division could have later made it public, perhaps in connection with a
disbarment proceeding. Furthermore, the inquiry was a relatively for-
mal one in which the appellants were to be pitted, in effect, against an
attorney from the state investigatory staff. In addition, the appellants
did not know what evidence had been found against them and conse-
quently could not know what questions would be asked them, nor the
" Pressures can be exerted to discourage an individual from raising his right against
self-incrimination. Obviously, such physical and psychological threats as the one in the
instant case are not without effect. If a public employee refuses to answer, his job may
be imperilled. See Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 24. U. CHI. L. REv. 472, 493-511 (1957). The most recent United
States Supreme Court pronouncement is Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, So S. Ct.
527 (196o). Unfavorable inferences of far reaching implication may be permitted.
See Ratner, supra, at 472-93. See generally, Griswold, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY
66-69 (z955).
Statutory immunity, of course, may offer only limited protection. Grant, Immunity
from Compulsory Self-Incrinination in a Federal System of Government, 9 TEMp. L.Q.
57, 194 (1934), Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
" The average witness has little idea of how or when to raise the right. In addition,
he cannot expect to cope with the nuances of the waiver doctrine and is hobbled by his
fear of a contempt charge. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 345-4-6 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
"Id. at 349 (dissenting opinion).
"Justice Frankfurter said in the Groban case that differences in degree must be
recognized. He thus implied that, whenever denying counsel subjects a party to immi-
nent harm, due process has been violated. Id. at 337 (concurring opinion).
"d 36o U.S. at 299 (dissenting opinion).
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implications thereof. When the threat against raising the fifth amend-
ment is added, their need for counsel becomes acute. Neither the pres-
ence of the presumably disinterested judge nor his assurances that no
prosecution was contemplated for them could outweigh these factors.
The promise of periodic consultation with their counsel held only
limited value for the appellants. Without legal assistance in the hearing
room they could have easily made a misleading or damaging statement,
especially in reply to some seemingly innocuous question. Moreover,
the fact that they might have left the hearing room to consult their
counsel was of limited value because their counsel would have had to
rely upon the appellants' nonprofessional recounting of their situation
at that point of the proceeding in formulating their advice.
There were no compelling reasons for denying counsel to the appel-
lants. It seems unlikely that the participation of their counsel would
have impeded the inquiry any more than would periodic interruptions
for outside consultation.37 Nor would the appellants' counsel, charged
with the confidence of their clients, have endangered the confidential
nature of the inquiry. Although appellants might have testified more
freely in the absence of their counsel, this is one of the dangers at which
the right to counsel is aimed and should be relied on as a ground for
denying counsel only in case of compelling public necessity.
" This assumes, of course, that denying appellants the privilege of ever consulting
their counsel would have been unconstitutional, or at least an abuse of the presiding
judge's discretion.
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